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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 930678-CA 
v. : 
RUSSELL CATALANO : Priority 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals the trial court's restitution order 
entered on his guilty pleas to three burglary counts (one second 
degree felony and two third degree felonies), pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1990), and to three theft counts (one 
second degree felony, one third degree felony, and one class A 
misdemeanor), pursuant to § 76-6-404 (1990). This Court has 
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (f) (Supp. 
1994) . 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Where defendant never objected to imposing complete 
restitution, has he preserved his claim that the trial court 
failed to consider certain statutory factors relevant only to 
determining whether to impose complete, partial, or nominal 
restitution? Because defendant did not object to imposing 
complete restitution, he has waived this claim. State v. Snyder, 
747 P.2d 417, 421 (Utah 1987). 
1 
2. Does the record contain sufficient evidence to support 
two of the restitution amounts set by the trial court? Defendant 
has neither marshalled the evidence supporting the trial court's 
determination of the amounts nor shown how the evidence fails to 
support them, precluding review of this claim on its merits. 
State v. Gray, 851 P.2d 1217, 1225 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 860 
P.2d 943 (Utah 1993). 
3. Did the trial court properly set the restitution amount 
for three items defendant stole at their original purchase price 
rather than at their fair market value where there was no 
evidence of their fair market value? This Court will not disturb 
the trial court's restitution order unless the trial court 
exceeded its legal authority or abused its discretion. State v. 
Twitchell, 832 P.2d 866, 868 (Utah App. 1992) (citations 
omitted). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Addendum A contains the text of the relevant constitutional 
provisions, statutes, and rules. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State charged defendant with one second degree felony 
burglary count, eight third degree felony burglary counts, five 
second degree felony theft counts, three third degree felony 
theft counts, and one class A misdemeanor theft count, pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-202 (1990) and 76-6-404 (1990) (R. 1-
4). Defendant pleaded guilty to the first six of the eighteen 
counts charged against him: three burglary counts (one second 
2 
degree felony and two third degree felonies), and three theft 
counts (a second degree felony, a third degree felony, and a 
class A misdemeanor) (R. 47-48) . The State moved to dismiss the 
other twelve counts and sought complete restitution on all of the 
charged counts (R. 36, 40, 138). 
The trial court sentenced defendant as follows: 
1. Counts I and V (third degree felony burglaries) and 
Count II (third degree felony theft): to serve an 
indeterminate prison term of 0-5 years on each count and to 
pay a fine of $5,000 on each count; 
2. Count III (second degree felony burglary) and Count VI 
(second degree felony theft): to serve an indeterminate 
prison term of 1-15 years on each count and to pay a fine of 
$10,000 on each count; 
3. Count IV (class A misdemeanor theft): to serve a one 
year prison term and to pay a fine of $2,500 
(R. 55-56) . The trial court suspended execution of the sentence 
and placed defendant on probation for a period of thirty-six 
months upon certain terms and conditions, including that 
defendant pay restitution (R. 55). 
On August 17, 1993, the trial court held a restitution 
hearing during which it heard evidence about the amount of each 
victim's loss and determined a restitution amount for each victim 
(Tr. Aug. 17, 1993). The trial court entered an order dated 
November 3, 1993 setting forth the amounts imposed, which 
totalled $15,844 (R. 112-114). 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
During February, March, and April of 1992, defendant and co-
defendant, Daniel J. Centano, stole property consisting primarily 
of tools, painting equipment, and other equipment used in home 
construction (R. 1-4; Tr. Aug. 17, 1993 at 6-7, 9, 13-14, 25-28, 
33-34, 70-72, 91-92). Defendant and co-defendant stole the 
property in part to equip their own business, C & C Painting (Tr. 
Aug 17, 1993 at 56-57) . 
Additional facts are recited in the argument sections to 
which they are relevant. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
1. Failure to consider statutory factors. Defendant 
claims this Court should reverse the trial court's restitution 
order because the trial court failed to consider his financial 
resources and the burden restitution would impose on his family. 
However, the plain language of the statute requires the court to 
consider those factors only when determining whether to order 
complete, partial, or nominal restitution. Defendant never 
objected to the State's representations that he had agreed to pay 
complete restitution, and all of the objections he made during 
the restitution hearing went to the proper calculation of 
property value, not to whether he should pay something less than 
complete restitution. Therefore, defendant has waived this 
claim. 
2. Sufficiency of the evidence. Defendant complains that 
the record contains insufficient evidence to support two of the 
4 
restitution amounts set by the trial court. However, defendant 
has neither marshalled the evidence supporting the court's 
determination nor shown how the marshalled evidence fails to 
justify it. Therefore, defendant has failed to meet his 
appellate burden to succeed on this claim. 
3. Calculation of restitution. Defendant claims that the 
trial court improperly ordered him to pay restitution for paint 
sprayers he stole from victim Richard Valgardson at the amount 
Mr. Valgardson paid to purchase them originally, arguing that the 
trial court could not order him to pay anything other than their 
fair market value. The sprayers' original purchase price and 
their replacement cost comprised the only evidence of their 
value. Defendant offered no evidence of their fair market value. 
Therefore, the trial court properly exercised its discretion to 
set the restitution amount for the sprayers at the lower original 
purchase price. 
ARGUMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
Pursuant to the parties' stipulation and this Court's order, 
defendant supplemented the record and filed a "supplemental" 
brief. However, defendant's supplemental brief contains all of 
the arguments in the original brief, and therefore appears to be 
a replacement brief. Therefore, the State will refer to and 
address only the points raised defendant's second brief. 
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POINT I 
BECAUSE DEFENDANT NEVER OBJECTED TO IMPOSITION OF 
COMPLETE RESTITUTION, HE CANNOT COMPLAIN THAT THE TRIAL 
COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER FACTORS RELEVANT ONLY TO 
DETERMINING WHETHER TO IMPOSE COMPLETE, PARTIAL, OR 
NOMINAL RESTITUTION 
Defendant first claims that the trial court failed to 
consider his financial resources and the burden restitution would 
impose on him even though Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(4) (c) (Supp. 
1993) required the court to do so. Appellant's Brief at 6-7. * 
By its plain language, the restitution statute requires the trial 
court to consider those factors in determining whether to order 
restitution, and whether to order complete, partial, or nominal 
restitution. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(4)(a)(ii) & (4)(c)(i)-
(iv) (Supp. 1993). The statute does not require the court to 
consider those factors when calculating the amount that 
constitutes complete restitution. 
The State represented to the trial court that it would seek 
full restitution (R. 13 8) and that defendant had agreed to pay-
full restitution as part of the plea bargain (Tr. August 17, 1993 
at 5-6). Defendant neither objected to these representations nor 
otherwise claimed that he had agreed to pay something other than 
1
 Defendant has relied on the version of § 76-3-201 contained 
in the main volume of the code, ignoring that that section was 
amended in 1992 and 1993. The 1993 amendments became effective on 
July 1, 1993, after defendant was sentenced, but before the trial 
court held the restitution hearing and entered its order setting 
the amount of restitution. 1993 Utah Laws ch. 17, §1. Although 
the statutory language relevant to defendant's claims is unchanged, 
the particular subsections where that language appears have been 
reorganized. The State will cite to the controlling (post July 1, 
1993) version of the statute. 
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complete restitution.2 At the restitution hearing, defendant's 
objections went to the proper valuation of some of the stolen 
property, whether the State had properly supported some of the 
amounts claimed, and whether the restitution statute permitted 
ordering restitution for some of the kinds of losses claimed (id. 
at 21-23, 46-47, 63-66, 68, 80, 86-87, 95-96, 102, 104-105). 
None of these objections has any relationship to defendant's 
ability to pay. Defendant objected only to how to calculate 
complete restitution, not to whether the court should order 
something less than complete restitution. 
Because the factors defendant now complains the trial court 
failed to consider concern only whether to order complete, 
partial, or nominal restitution, and because defendant acquiesced 
in ordering complete restitution, he has not preserved this 
claim. Therefore, he cannot rely on it as a basis for reversal. 
State v. Snvder, 747 P.2d 417, 421 (Utah 1987) (the defendant 
2
 The closest defendant came to making such a statement 
came near the end of the restitution hearing, when he stated he 
understood the plea agreement required him to pay only one-half of 
the restitution. However, when the trial court explained that 
there may be joint and several liability with co-defendant but that 
that did not "exonerate [defendant] for the damages to these 
victims," neither defendant nor defendant's counsel made any 
further comment (Tr. Aug. 17, 1993 at 115-16). The trial court's 
comment, along with the statements by the prosecutor established 
that defendant had agreed to pay complete restitution, and neither 
defense counsel nor defendant requested that the court order 
something less than complete restitution. Furthermore, the record 
rebuts defendant's belated statement that he thought he would be 
responsible for only one-half of the restitution. In a pre-hearing 
letter to the court, defendant acknowledged his responsibility to 
pay restitution of approximately $13,000, the amount at which 
complete restitution had been calculated prior to the hearing (R. 
89) . 
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waived any challenge to the trial court's failure to enter 
written findings on its restitution order by lodging no objection 
to imposition, amount, or distribution of the restitution 
ordered). 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT HAS NEITHER MARSHALLED THE EVIDENCE 
SUPPORTING THE TRIAL COURT'S RESTITUTION CALCULATIONS 
NOR SHOWN THAT THE MARSHALLED EVIDENCE FAILS TO SUPPORT 
THE AMOUNTS AWARDED 
Defendant describes Point II of the brief as a challenge to 
the sufficiency of the trial court's findings to support its 
"findings of restitution." However, the substance of the 
argument does not address the sufficiency of the findings at all. 
Rather, defendant makes two claims in Point II: 1) that 
restitution amounts ordered for victim Richard Valgardson's 
stolen paint sprayers fall outside the statutory definition of 
the "pecuniary damages" the trial court had the authority to 
award; and 2) that some of the amounts calculated lack support in 
the evidence. Appellant's Brief at 7-8.3 
3
 If defendant had challenged the sufficiency of the 
findings themselves, that claim would have failed for two reasons. 
First, defendant failed to challenge the sufficiency of the 
findings below; therefore, he has waived it for purposes of appeal. 
State v. Labrum, 246 Utah Adv. R. 11, 14-15 (Utah App. 1994) (the 
defendant could not challenge the trial court's lack of written 
findings to support his sentence enhancement where he did not 
challenge the lack of findings in the trial court). Second, the 
statute requires the court to state its reasons supporting its 
determination that restitution is appropriate or inappropriate; it 
does not require the court to justify on the record the reasons for 
setting each dollar amount. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (4) (d) (i) 
(Supp. 1993). 
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The first claim simply repeats the claim defendant raises in 
Point III of his brief (that the court exceeded its sentencing 
authority); the State addresses that claim in Point III of this 
brief. In the second claim, defendant alleges that the evidence 
does not support the following restitution amounts ordered: 1) 
$3,000 for Mr. Valgardson's losses from down-time due to 
defendant's theft of his paint sprayers; and 2) $1,000 for Ray 
Hernandez's losses on the subcontracting jobs he could not 
perform as a result of defendant's theft of his equipment. 
In order to succeed on a challenge to the sufficiency of the 
evidence supporting a trial court determination, defendant has 
the appellate burden to marshal all of the evidence supporting 
that determination, then to show how the marshalled evidence 
fails to support it. State v. Gray, 851 P.2d 1217, 1225 (Utah 
App.) (considering a sufficiency challenge in the context of a 
trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to dismiss), cert. 
denied, 860 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993); State v. Drobel, 815 P.2d 724, 
734 (Utah App.) (considering a sufficiency challenge to a trial 
court's determination that defendant had made a knowing and 
intelligent waiver of his right to representation), cert. denied, 
836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1991). Defendant has done neither. 
Mr. Valgardson used the paint sprayers to paint houses in 
his modular home manufacturing business (Tr. Aug. 17 1993 at 32-
33). The business operated on an assembly line with production 
volume contributing to profits (id. at 42-43). Mr. Valgardson 
had between eighteen and twenty-six homes in various stages of 
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production at any give time, and it cost him approximately 
$23,000 per day to operate his business (id. at 35, 40-41) . 
Using the paint sprayers, his painters could paint a house in two 
hours (id. at 41). After defendant stole the sprayers, Mr. 
Valgardson's painters had to use rollers and brushes to paint the 
houses, increasing the painting time to six to eight hours per 
house (id.). This delay affected other manufacturing processes; 
for example, the framers could not start as many houses and the 
electricians could not wire them (id. at 41-43). Mr. Valgardson 
replaced one of the three sprayers defendant stole within one 
week of the theft, and the other two within six weeks, when his 
cash flow permitted (id. at 37, 40-41) . 
Mr. Valgardson admitted that he could not state with 
certainty how much money he lost as a result of the delays the 
stolen sprayers caused; however, he gave a "conservative" 
estimate of $6,000 to $10,000 (id. at 42-43). The trial court 
acknowledged that Mr. Valgardson could only estimate the amount 
of his down-time losses, but also acknowledged that he had 
obviously suffered such losses (id. at 66-68) . Therefore, the 
court ordered $3,000 restitution for the down-time losses, only 
fifty percent of Mr. Valgardson's conservative low estimate (id. 
at 67-68). 
Victim Ray Hernandez could not appear at the restitution 
hearing (id. at 90). According to his wife, Mr. Hernandez's 
losses included lost earnings from subcontracting jobs that he 
could not perform without the equipment defendant stole from him. 
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Ms. Hernandez knew of three subcontracting jobs her husband 
turned down because he did not have the equipment to do them and 
that he made $1,700 to $2,000 per job (id at 94, 97). She also 
knew that he usually had about one such job per month (id. at 
97). However, she testified that she did not know how many 
subcontracting jobs her husband could have found during the year 
between the time defendant stole her husband's equipment and the 
time her husband replaced it, and therefore she did not know her 
husband's total losses for that period (id. at 94). The court 
awarded $1,000 for the profits Mr. Hernandez's lost from the 
subcontracting jobs he could not obtain (id. at 117) . 
Defendant marshals none of this evidence. This failure 
alone precludes reversal based on his insufficiency claim. State 
v. Gray, 851 P.2d at 1225. 
Defendant also fails to show that the evidence was 
insufficient to support the amounts ordered for Mr. Valgardson's 
down-time and Mr. Hernandez's lost subcontracting jobs. As to 
Mr. Valgardson's down-time losses, defendant complains only that 
Mr. Valgardson "speculated" about the amount. However, defendant 
provides no legal authority or analysis to establish that Mr. 
Valgardson's conservative estimate cannot independently support 
the restitution award or what quantum of proof was necessary. 
Id.; State v. Yates, 834 P.2d 599, 602 (Utah App. 1992) (refusing 
to reach the merits of an argument unsupported by legal authority 
or analysis). Cf. Fee v. State, 656 P.2d 1202, 1205-1206 (Alaska 
App. 1982) (the trial court could rely on victim's testimony 
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about the amount of his losses absent any contradictory 
evidence). 
Similarly, defendant complains about the restitution amounts 
ordered for Mr. Hernandez's lost subcontracting jobs because, 
according to defendant, Ms. Hernandez testified that did not know 
the amount of this loss. Appellant's Brief at 8. However, the 
testimony on which defendant relies referred only to her 
husband's subcontracting losses for the entire year (id. at 94). 
She had personal knowledge of at least three jobs her husband 
turned down as a result of defendant's theft of his equipment; 
she also knew his subcontracting jobs usually $1,700 to $2,000 
(id. at 94, 97). Therefore, she had personal knowledge of $5,100 
to $6,000 in lost earnings defendant's theft caused. This 
testimony more than amply supports the trial court's $1,000 
restitution order for those losses.4 
In sum, defendant has neither marshalled the evidence 
supporting the amounts the court ordered in restitution nor shown 
how the marshalled evidence is insufficient to support those 
amounts. Therefore, he has not met his appellate burden to 
succeed on this claim. 
4
 If anything, the trial court ordered only partial 
restitution for Mr. Valgardson's down time and Mr. Hernandez's lost 
subcontracting jobs. 
12 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT REASONABLY EXERCISED ITS DISCRETION IN 
ORDERING DEFENDANT TO PAY RESTITUTION IN THE AMOUNT OF 
THE ORIGINAL PURCHASE PRICE OF STOLEN PROPERTY5 
Defendant next claims that the trial court exceeded its 
statutory sentencing authority by imposing restitution for the 
"cost" to Mr. Valgardson of three "new" paint sprayers, when the 
three sprayers defendant stole from him were used. Appellant's 
Brief at 7-8. In substance, defendant claims the court could 
only require him to pay restitution based on the fair market 
value of the sprayers. Appellant's Brief at 8. 
Mr. Valgardson paid $5,935.04 when he originally purchased 
the sprayers and paid approximately $7,500 to replace them (Tr. 
Aug. 17, 1993 at 33-38) . Because there is a very limited market 
for sprayers, Mr. Valgardson could not state a fair market price 
for sprayers of a similar age and model (id. at 35-36) . 
Defendant offered no evidence of the sprayers' fair market 
value.6 The trial court ordered defendant to pay the original 
purchase price ($5,935.04) for the sprayers. 
5
 In Point III of his brief, defendant also claims that 
trial court abused its sentencing discretion by failing to consider 
his financial situation and the burden restitution would impose on 
him. For the reasons argued in Point I, defendant relieved the 
court of that obligation by agreeing or at least not objecting to 
the imposition of complete restitution. 
6
 One of the other victims testified he believed a used 
sprayer would sell for approximately $1,500, but the record 
contains no detail to establish that he was speaking of sprayers 
similar to those defendant stole from Mr. Valgardson (Tr. August 
17, 1993 at 30). 
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The restitution statute required the trial court to order 
restitution in an amount up to double the victims' "pecuniary 
damages," and defines "pecuniary damages" as "all special damages 
. . . which a person could recover against defendant in a civil 
action arising out of the facts or events constituting the 
defendant's criminal activities . . . . " Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-
201(4)(a)(i) and (1)(c) (Supp. 1993). 
In State v. Twitchell, 832 P.2d 866 (Utah App. 1992), this 
Court analogized a theft by deception to a conversion of the 
property taken and used that theory to review the trial court's 
restitution award. Id. at 869-70.7 As this Court noted, 
damages in a conversion action are calculated on the "full value" 
of the property. Id. at 870. However, "full value" does not 
always equate to fair market value. To the contrary, a trial 
court may rely on other evidence to determine value, such as the 
original purchase price or the replacement cost. Lvm v. 
Thompson, 184 P.2d 667, 669-70 (Utah 1947) (in a conversion 
action for stolen pipe, the supreme court rejected the 
defendant's claim that the trial court should have limited the 
plaintiff's recovery to a published ceiling price for used pipe, 
and affirmed the trial court's reliance on the original purchase 
price). See generally Dan Dobbs, Remedies, § 5.12 (1973). 
The record contains only two figures to establish the 
sprayers' value: the original purchase price and the higher 
7
 Defendant misreads the outcome of Twitchell. Contrary to 
his argument, this Court affirmed the restitution award. Id. at 
868. 
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replacement cost.8 Either amount is a proper measure of their 
value, and well within the double damages limit in the 
restitution statute. Therefore, the trial court reasonably 
exercised its discretion when it selected the lower of the only 
two amounts offered to establish the sprayers' value. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests 
that this Court affirm the trial court's restitution award. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ day of ^%^^/- , 
1994. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
& 
THOMAS BRUNKER 
Assistant Attorney General 
8
 The only evidence defendant presented was the amount he 
received when he pawned the sprayers; however, he admitted that 
this did not represent their fair market value (Tr. August 17, 1993 
at 53-55). 
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ADDENDUM A 
PUNISHMENTS 76-3-201 
Section 
76-3-201. 
76-3-201.2. 
76-3-203.1. 
76-3-203.2. 
76-3-203.3. 
CHAPTER 3 
PUNISHMENTS 
Part 2 
Sentencing 
Sentences or combination of 
sentences allowed — Civil 
penalties — Restitution — 
Hearing — Definitions — Re-
sentencing — Aggravation or 
mitigation of crimes with 
mandatory sentences. 
Civil action by victim for dam-
ages 
Offenses committed by three or 
more persons — Enhanced 
penalties. 
Definitions — Use of firearm in 
offenses committed on or 
about school premises — En-
hanced penalties. 
Penalty for hate crimes — Civil 
rights violation. 
Section 
76-3-206. 
76-3-207. 
76-3-207.5. 
Capital felony — Penalties. 
Capital felony — Sentencing 
proceeding. 
Applicability — Effect on sen-
tencing — Options of of-
fenders. 
Part 3 
Fines and Special Sanctions 
76-3-301. Fines of persons. 
Part 4 
Limitations and Special Provisions on 
Sentences 
76-3-402. Conviction of lower degree of of-
fense. 
76-3-404. Presentence investigation and 
diagnostic evaluation — 
Commitment of defendant — 
Sentencing procedure. 
PART 2 
SENTENCING 
76-3-201. Sentences or combination of sentences allowed 
— Civil penalties — Restitution — Hearing — Def-
initions — Resentencing — Aggravation or miti-
gation of crimes with mandatory sentences. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) ''Conviction" includes a: 
(i) judgment of guilt; and 
(ii) plea of guilty. 
(b) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is 
convicted or any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits 
responsibility to the sentencing court with or without an admission of 
committing the criminal conduct. 
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general 
damages, which a person could recover against the defendant in a civil 
action arising out of the facts or events constituting the defendant's crimi-
nal activities and includes the money equivalent of property taken, de-
stroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses including earnings and 
medical expenses. 
(d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary 
damages to a victim, including insured damages, and payment for ex-
penses to a governmental entity for extradition or transportation. 
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(e) (i) "Victim" means any person whom the court determines has suf-
fered pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant's criminal activ-
ities. 
(ii) "Victim" does not include any coparticipant in the defendant's 
criminal activities. 
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a 
person adjudged guilty of an offense to any one of the following sentences or 
combination of them: 
(a) to pay a fine; 
(b) to removal from or disqualification of public or private office; 
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law; 
(d) to imprisonment; 
(e) to life imprisonment; 
(f) on or after April 27, 1992, to life in prison without parole; or 
(g) to death. 
(3) (a) This chapter does not deprive a court of authority conferred by law 
to: 
(i) forfeit property; 
(ii) dissolve a corporation; 
(iii) suspend or cancel a license; 
(iv) permit removal of a person from office; 
(v) cite for contempt; or 
(vi) impose any other civil penalty, 
(b) A civil penalty may be included in a sentence. 
(4) (a) (i) WThen a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted 
in pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may im-
pose, the court shall order that the defendant make restitution up to 
double the amount of pecuniary damages to the victim or victims of 
the offense of which the defendant has been convicted, or to the vic-
tim of any other criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the 
sentencing court. 
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court 
shall consider the criteria in Subsection (c). 
(b) (i) When a defendant has been extradited to this state under Title 
77, Chapter 30, Extradition, to resolve pending criminal charges and 
is convicted of criminal activity in the county to which he has been 
returned, the court may, in addition to any other sentence it may 
impose, order that the defendant make restitution for costs expended 
by any governmental entity for the extradition. 
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court 
shall consider the criteria in Subsection (c). 
(c) In determining whether or not to order restitution, or restitution 
that is complete, partial, or nominal under this subsection, the court shall 
take into account: 
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the burden that 
payment of restitution will impose, with regard to the other obliga-
tions of the defendant; 
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment 
basis or on other conditions to be fixed by the court; 
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of 
restitution and the method of payment; and 
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(iv) other circumstances which the court determines make restitu-
tion inappropriate. 
(d) (i) When the court determines that restitution is appropriate or 
inappropriate under this subsection, the court shall make the reasons 
for the decision a part of the court record. 
(ii) The court shall send a copy of its order of restitution to the 
Division of Finance. 
(e) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of 
the restitution, the court shall at the time of sentencing allow him a full 
hearing on the issue. 
(5) (a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, the court 
shall order the defendant to pay restitution of governmental transporta-
tion expenses if the defendant was: 
(i) transported pursuant to court order from one county to another 
within the state at governmental expense to resolve pending criminal 
charges; 
(ii) charged with a felony or a class A, B, or C misdemeanor; and 
(iii) convicted of a crime. 
(b^  The court may not order the defendant to pay restitution of govern-
mental transportation expenses if any of the following apply: 
(i) the defendant is charged with an infraction or on a subsequent 
failure to appear warrant issued for an infraction; 
(ii) the defendant was not transported pursuant to a court order. 
(c) (i) Restitution of governmental transportation expenses under Sub-
section (a)(i) shall be calculated according to the following schedule: 
(A) $75 for up to 100 miles a defendant is transported; 
(B) $125 for 100 up to 200 miles a defendant is transported; 
(C) $250 for 200 miles or more a defendant is transported. 
(ii) The schedule of restitution under Subsection (i) applies to each 
defendant transported regardless of the number of defendants actu-
ally transported in a single trip. 
(6) (a) If a statute under which the defendant was convicted mandates that 
one of three stated minimum terms shall be imposed, the court shall order 
imposition of the term of middle severity unless there are circumstances 
in aggravation or mitigation of the crime. 
(b) Prior to or at the time of sentencing, either party may submit a 
statement identifying circumstances in aggravation or mitigation or pre-
senting additional facts. If the statement is in writing, it shall be filed 
with the court and served on the opposing party at least four days prior to 
the time set for sentencing. 
(c) In determining whether there are circumstances that justify imposi-
tion of the highest or lowest term, the court may consider the record in 
the case, the probation officer's report, other reports, including reports 
received under Section 76-3-404, statements in aggravation or mitigation 
submitted by the prosecution or the defendant, and any further evidence 
introduced at the sentencing hearing. 
(d) The court shall set forth on the record the facts supporting and 
reasons for imposing the upper or lower term. 
(e) The court in determining a just sentence shall consider sentencing 
guidelines regarding aggravation and mitigation promulgated by the 
Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice. 
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(7) (a) (i) If a defendant subject to Subsection (6) has been sentenced and 
committed to the Utah State Prison, the court may, within 120 days 
of the date of commitment on its own motion, or at any time upon the 
recommendation of the Board of Pardons, recall the sentence and 
commitment previously ordered and resentence the defendant in the 
same manner as if he had not previously been sentenced, so long as 
the new sentence is no greater than the initial sentence nor less than 
the mandatory time prescribed by statute. 
(ii) The resentencing provided for in this section shall take into 
consideration the sentencing guidelines established under this sec-
tion by the Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice to elimi-
nate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing. 
(iii) Credit shall be given for time served. 
(b) (i) The court shall state the reasons for its sentence choice on the 
record at the time of sentencing. 
(ii) The court shall also inform the defendant as part of the sen-
tence that if the defendant is released from prison he may be on 
parole for a period of ten years. 
(c) If during the commission of a crime described as child kidnapping, 
rape of a child, object rape of a child, sodomy upon a child, or sexual abuse 
of a child, the defendant causes substantial bodily injury to the child, and 
if the charge is set forth in the information or indictment and admitted by 
the defendant, or found true by a judge or jury at trial, the defendant 
shall be sentenced to the aggravated mandatory term in state prison. This 
subsection takes precedence over any conflicting provision of law. 
History: C. 1953, 76-3-201, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-3-201; 1979, ch. 69, § 1; 
1981, ch. 59, § 1; 1983, ch. 85, § 1; 1983, ch. 
88, § 3; 1984, ch. 18, § 1; 1986, ch. 156, § 1; 
1987, ch. 107, § 1; 1990, ch. 81, § 1; 1992, ch. 
142, § 1; 1993, ch. 17, § 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend-
ment, effective April 23, 1990, substituted 
"consider sentencing guidelines" for "be guided 
by sentencing rules" and "Commission on 
Criminal and Juvenile Justice" for "Judicial 
Council" in Subsection (5)(e); substituted "take 
into consideration the sentencing guidelines 
established under this section by the Commis-
sion on Criminal and Juvenile Justice" for 
"comply with the sentencing rules of the Judi-
cial Council" in the second sentence in Subsec-
tion (6)(a); and made stylistic and punctuation 
changes. 
The 1992 amendment, effective April 27, 
1992, added Subsections (l)(e) and (f) and re-
designated former Subsection (l)(e) as (l)(g); 
subdivided Subsection (4)(d); substituted 
"takes precedence over" for "supersedes" in 
Subsection (6He); and made stylistic changes 
throughout the section. 
The 1993 amendment, effective July 1, 1993, 
added Subsection (1), redesignating the follow-
ing subsections accordingly; subdivided Sub-
section (3); substituted present Subsection 
(4Ka)(ii) for former language requiring the 
court to consider the criteria in Subsection 
(3)(b) and to make the reasons for its decision a 
part of the court record; deleted language relat-
ing to transportation of a defendant from Sub-
section (4)(b)(i); substituted "Subsection (c)" for 
"Subsection (3;«b)" and deleted two sentences 
now comprising Subsection (4)(d) in Subsection 
(4)(b)(ii); inserted "under this subsection" in 
Subsections (4)(c) and (4)(d); deleted former 
Subsecjtion (4), defining terms; added Subsec-
tion (5); subdivided Subsections (7Ha) and 
(7Kb); and made stylistic changes. 
Cross-References. — Commission on Crim-
inal and Juvenile Justice, § 63-25-1 et seq. 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 52 Am Jur 2d Malicious C.J.S. — 54 C J S Malicious or Criminal 
Mischief § 1 Mischief or Damage to Property § 3 
Key Numbers. — Malicious Mischief ®= 1 
PART 2 
BURGLARY AND CRIMINAL TRESPASS 
76-6-201. Definitions. 
For the purposes of this part: 
(1) "Building," in addition to its ordinary meaning, means any water-
craft, aircraft, trailer, sleeping car, or other structure or vehicle adapted 
for overnight accommodation of persons or for carrying on business 
therein and includes: 
(a) Each separately secured or occupied portion of the structure or 
vehicle; and 
(b) Each structure appurtenant to or connected with the structure 
or vehicle. 
(2) "Dwelling" means a building which is usually occupied by a person 
lodging therein at night, whether or not a person is actually present. 
(3) A person "enters or remains unlawfully" in or upon premises when 
the premises or any portion thereof at the time of the entry or remaining 
are not open to the public and when the actor is not otherwise licensed or 
privileged to enter or remain on the premises or such portion thereof. 
(4) "Enter" means: 
(a) Intrusion of any part of the body; or 
(b) Intrusion of any physical object under control of the actor. 
History: C. 1953, 76-6-201, enacted by L. Cross-References. — Civil provisions, 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-201. entry and detainer, § 78-36-1 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 13 Am Jur 2d Burglary What is "building" or "house" within bur-
§ 1 glary or breaking and entering statute, 68 
C.J.S. — 12A C.J S Burglary § 2. A L R 4th 425 
A.L.R. — Maintainability of burglary Key Numbers. — Burglary e=> 1 
charge, where entry into building is made with 
consent, 58 A L R 4th 335 
76-6-202. Burglary. 
(1) A person is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully in a 
building or any portion of a building with intent to commit a felony or theft or 
commit an assault on any person. 
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third degree unless it was committed in a 
dwelling, in which event it is a felony of the second degree. 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 50 Am Jur 2d Larceny session of stolen goods to support inference of 
§ 10 burglary or other felonious taking, 51 A L R 
C.J.S. — 52A C J S Larceny § 4 3d 727 
A.L.R. — What amounts to "exclusive" pos- Key Numbers. — Larceny *» 12. 
76-6-403. Theft — Evidence to support accusation. 
Conduct denominated theft in this part constitutes a single offense embrac-
ing the separate offenses such as those heretofore known as larceny, larceny 
by trick, larceny by bailees, embezzlement, false pretense, extortion, black-
mail, receiving stolen property. An accusation of theft may be supported by 
evidence that it was committed in any manner specified in Sections 76-6-404 
through 76-6-410, subject to the power of the court to ensure a fair trial by 
granting a continuance or other appropriate relief where the conduct of the 
defense would be prejudiced by lack of fair notice or by surprise. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
History: C. 1953, 76-6-403, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-403; 1974, ch. 32, § 17. 
ANALYSIS 
Evidence 
Pleading and practice 
Receiving stolen property 
Evidence. 
Fingerprint evidence, based on a comparison 
of defendant's fingerprints with those found at 
the scene of the crime, along with the testi-
mony of defendant's accomplice, was sufficient 
evidence to find defendant guilty of burglary 
and theft State v Bailey, 712 P 2d 281 (Utah 
1985) 
Pleading and practice. 
Section 76-6-404 is the "general offense of 
76-6-404. Theft — Elements. 
History: C. 1953, 76-6-404, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-404. 
theft" required to be pled by this section to in-
voke the provisions of consolidated theft Once 
the prosecution charges a defendant with the 
general offense of "theft" under § 76-6-404, it 
may then present its evidence to prove the 
theft was committed in any manner specified 
m §§ 76-6-404 to 76-6-410 State v Fowler, 
745 P 2d 472 (Utah Ct App 1987) 
Receiving stolen property. 
Evidence that establishes receiving stolen 
property under § 76-6-408 is sufficient to sus-
tain a conviction of theft without the necessity 
of establishing theft by taking State v Taylor, 
570 P 2d 697 (Utah 1977) 
Cross-References. — Motor vehicles, spe-
cial anti-theft laws, §§ 41-1-105 to 14-1-121 
Shoplifting Act, § 78-11-14 et seq 
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over 
the property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof. 
165 
78-2a-3 JUDICIAL CODE 228 
tional compensation $1,000 per annum or fraction 
thereof for the period served. 
(2) The Court of Appeals shall sit and render judg-
ment in panels of three judges. Assignment to panels 
shall be by random rotation of all judges of the Court 
of Appeals. The Court of Appeals by rule shall pro-
vide for the selection of a chair for each panel. The 
Court of Appeals may not sit en banc. 
(3) The judges of the Court of Appeals shall elect a 
presiding judge from among the members of the court 
by majority vote of all judges. The term of office of the 
presiding judge is two years and until a successor is 
elected. A presiding judge of the Court of Appeals 
may serve in that office no more than two successive 
terms. The Court of Appeals may by rule provide for 
an acting presiding judge to serve in the absence or 
incapacity of the presiding judge. 
(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the 
office of presiding judge by majority vote of all judges 
of the Court of Appeals. In addition to the duties of a 
judge of the Court of Appeals, the presiding judge 
shall: 
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of 
panels; 
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court; 
(c) call and preside over the meetings of the 
Court of Appeals; and 
(d) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme 
Court and the Judicial Council. 
(5) Filing fees for the Court of Appeals are the 
same as for the Supreme Court. 1988 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue 
all extraordinary writs and to issue all writs and pro-
cess necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, 
and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, 
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from 
formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies 
or appeals from the district court review of infor-
mal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, ex-
cept the Public Service Commission, State Tax 
Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of Oil, 
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of 
political subdivisions of the state or other lo-
cal agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under 
Section 63-46a-12.1; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except 
those from the small claims department of a cir-
cuit court; 
(e) interlocutory appeals from any court of 
record in criminal cases, except those involving a 
charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from a court of record in criminal 
cases, except those involving a conviction of a 
first degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for ex-
traordinary writs sought by persons who are in-
carcerated or serving any other criminal sen-
tence, except petitions constituting a challenge to 
a conviction of or the sentence for a first degree 
or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from the orders on petitions for ex-
traordinary writs challenging the decisions of the 
Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases in-
volving a first degree or capital felony; 
(i) appeals from district court involving domes-
tic relations cases, including, but not limited to, 
divorce, annulment, property division, child cus-
tody, support, visitation, adoption, and paternity; 
(j) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(k) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals 
from the Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only 
and by the vote of four judges of the court may certify 
to the Supreme Court for original appellate review 
and determination any matter over which the Court 
of Appeals has original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the re-
quirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative 
Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative 
proceedings. ISM 
78-2a-4. Review of actions by Supreme Court 
Review of the judgments, orders, and decrees of the 
Court of Appeals shall be by petition for writ of certi-
orari to the Supreme Court. 1966 
78-2a-5. Location of Court of Appeals. 
The Court of Appeals has its principal location in 
Salt Lake City. The Court of Appeals may perform 
any of its functions in any location within the state. 
1986 
CHAPTER 3 
DISTRICT COURTS 
Section 
78-3-1 to 78-3-2. Repealed. 
78-3-3. Term of judges — Vacancy. 
78-3-4. Jurisdiction — Transfer of cases to cir-
cuit court — Appeals — Jurisdiction 
when circuit and district court 
merged. 
78-3-5. Repealed. 
78-3-6. Terms — Minimum of once quarterly. 
78-3-7 to 78-3-11. Repealed. 
78-3-11.5. State District Court Administrative 
System. 
78-3-12. Repealed. 
78-3-12.5. Costs of system. 
78-3-13. Repealed. 
78-3-13.4. Counties joining court system — Pro-
cedure — Facilities — Salaries. 
78-3-13.5, 78-3-14. Repealed. 
78-3-14.5. Allocation of district court fees and 
fines. 
78-3-15 to 78-3-17. Repealed. 
78-3-17.5. Application of savings accruing to 
counties. 
78-3-18. Judicial Administration Act — Short 
title. 
78-3-19. Purpose of act. 
78-3-20. Definitions. 
78-3-21. Judicial Council — Creation — Mem-
bers — Terms and election — Re-
sponsibilities — Reports. 
78-3-21.5. Data bases for judicial boards. 
78-3-22. Presiding officer — Compensation — 
Duties. 
78-3-23. Administrator of the courts — Ap-
pointment — Qualifications — Sal-
ary. 
78-3-24. Court administrator — Powers, du-
ties, and responsibilities. 
